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Triangle Partition → Ternary symmetric justified envy-free triples Complexity open

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Why this question matters

This isolates existence complexity in a small-valued symmetric coalition model.

Results for asymmetric preferences, larger utility alphabets or stronger stability notions do not classify the stated ternary symmetric justified-envy predicate.

The reduction to construct

The source gives a simple graph. Its outputs are partitions of its vertices into triples each inducing a triangle, or NO-SOLUTION.

The target has symmetric pair values in {0,1,2} and asks for a partition into triples with no justified envy. An agent envies replacing another when its utility improves and both remaining members strictly prefer the incoming agent.

Construct deterministic polynomial-time maps F and G: F sends every legal source instance to a legal target instance, and G(x,y) is a valid source output for every valid output y of F(x). Preserve the stated threshold, domain and promises. The requested complexity conclusion is NP-hardness for the stated target problem.

Every unintended triple must be excluded under the exact justified-envy condition, rather than a stronger stability notion.

What a complete answer must include

Give explicit construction and recovery algorithms, a general proof for every legal input and every valid target output, and polynomial runtime and encoding-size bounds. Specify finite output encodings and handle NO-SOLUTION outputs when applicable. Tests compare recovered source outputs with independent source solutions.

References

  1. 2024 paper ↗
  2. arXiv record ↗

Literature checked 2026-09-16. This summarizes the archived literature search on the date above. Unpublished, unindexed and overlooked work remains outside coverage; no new novelty assessment was performed.